We’re learning a bit more about the “unprecedented powers” that President Obama and Sec. Treas. Geithner are seeking to deal with instability that exists in the financial system. But to understand what’s needed going forward, it’s important to see how we got here.
In the 1920s, commercial banks were selling stocks to their customers in addition to making loans and taking deposits. As stock prices rose, buying on margin became the way to leverage money into larger gains. For example, you could buy 100 shares of stock, pay a portion and borrow the rest from the bank or brokerage house. That worked so long as the prices continued to climb. But as prices started to fall, the banks insisted that buyers cover their loans. If you didn’t have the cash, you had to sell some or all of your shares, thus forcing the price even lower. Not only were individuals speculating, but so were the banks themselves, and when the banks were no longer able to cover requests for withdrawals, panic ensued. There had been previous panics, but nothing like what happened at the start of the Depression. Over 4,000 banks failed. Deposits were not insured. If your bank failed, you were out of luck.
In 1933, the government passed the Glass-Steagall Act. It established the FDIC to insure deposits and provide for an orderly take-down and resolution of failing banks. (Banks pay into the FDIC insurance fund, and the taxpayers make up any overages.) We take the FDIC for granted, knowing that as depositors we will be made whole (currently up to $250,000) if our bank fails. But that security came with restrictions and regulations for the banks. To limit speculation, Glass-Steagall also separated financial institutions — commercial banks, investment banks, and insurance companies — based on the type of business they did.
All went well until we forgot the lessons of the Depression, and once again the siren song of laissez-faire economic theory took hold. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 allowed banks to merge. It also gave banks, rather than the Federal Reserve, the power to set interest rates on deposits. Two years later, the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act deregulated the savings and loans, and adjustable rate mortgages were allowed.
Within a decade, the savings and loan industry in the United States collapsed. The cause of individual failures varied, but a common factor seems to have been the combination of reduced regulation, a lack of oversight, and the introduction of new and unproven financial instruments. Loan underwriting got sloppy, and there were home equity credit cards. Again, so long as prices climbed, all was well, but when other economic factors caused a slump in real estate prices, those credit cards resembled the margin buying of the 1920s. The number of savings and loan failures swamped FSLIC, the S&L version of the FDIC, and The Resolution Trust corporation was established to dispose of the failed institution’s assets, i.e., the loans on their books and the bank-owned properties. Many of these institutions were purchased by banks so that for depositors, life went on.
Despite all this, the pressure for additional deregulation continued. In 1999, Congress passed and President Clinton signed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. It repealed that portion of Glass-Steagall that prohibited the mixing of commercial banks, investment banks, and insurance companies. A series of mergers followed, and a new raft of exotic financial instruments was born. It was a perfect storm, and the consequences were completely predictable. In fact, Senator Byron Dorgan (D-ND) was eerily prescient at the time, predicting the timing as well as the need for massive government bailouts and putting a lie to any who claim that nobody could have foreseen the current crisis. One simply needed to remove ideological blinders and look at history.
When word first came that the administration was seeking new regulations, I hoped that they repeal Gramm-Leach-Bliley along with some of the other deregulatory actions and reinstitute Glass-Steagall. But alas, it seems that the effects of Gramm-Leach-Bliley will be as difficult to undo as are those credit default swaps that sank AIG.
If financial institutions have combined into these new hybrid, uber-institutions, then it makes sense that to have regulations that apply to all aspects of their business. And it also makes sense that we need a mechanism to ensure an orderly take-down should they fail. FDIC works well, and it can serve as a model for any new mechanism. I still hope Congress will re-think the wisdom of permitting a corporation to become so big and so entwined in the financial system that it cannot be allowed to fail. “Too big to fail” sounds like it is a prescription for taking excessive risk — for looking at short-term, easy money. While FDIC insures deposits, that’s not to say that the failure of a bank comes at no cost to the taxpayers. The recent failure of Indy Mac cost the shareholders as well as the taxpayers. The shareholder losses came as a result of Indy Mac ceasing to exist. The taxpayers had to pay the administrative costs of disposing of the bad loans and foreclosed properties.
I don’t begrudge some people making more money than others. But I wonder if anyone is worth 350 times the salary of the average American worker. And I don’t begrudge bonuses, but shouldn’t there be some relationship between a bonus and performance? Between a retention bonus and the recipient actually still working for the corporation? I’m a big fan of stock options as a bonus, especially if there is a time lag between the time they’re awarded and the time they can be exercised (at the stock price at the time of the award). That time lag ensures that employees will continue to perform; there isn’t much incentive to exercise the option if the stock value has declined. I’m all for regulating to contain greed as greed (combined with the relaxation of regulation and oversight) was a major cause of the current situation.
Clearly we are part of a global economy; solutions need to to be developed in concert and cooperation with other nations. And consumers need better protection from the rapacious ways of the economic Masters of the Universe. These elements are also part of Geithner’s proposal. There are still powerful forces who, despite the current situation, are disciples of laissez-faire economic theory. They will fight any and all regulatory attempts. And because Congress counts on them to fill their campaign coffers, Congress must be reminded that they represent the people, not just corporations.
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